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tired of war. The Royalists promised to the Greek electorate to bring about the end of war, the diminution of the burden of taxation, and the lowering of prices. If it is objected that the Greeks were not tired of war, seeing that they are still under arms, I may reply that the desperate diplomatic plight into which Greece was led by the present régime and the resulting dangers to the Greater Greece of Mr. Venizelos have aroused the Greeks, Venizelists and Royalists alike, to the realization that, weary as they are of war, they must save with their arms what Mr. Venizelos had gained mostly with his head.

AS TO PRESENT RÉGIME

The "impartiality" of Mr. Gennadius is quite evident, finally, from the fact that while he depicts in the blackest colors the internal administration of Greece under Mr. Venizelos, he does not seem to find any words to picture the actual conditions in Greece. He observed from London that the internal situation in Greece was such as Greece "had never witnessed before." But has he read the declarations of Mr. Eutaxias, leading Royalist member of Parliament, who only a few months ago denounced publicly the lawlessness, jobbery, corruption, incapacity, and illiberality of the present régime, which Mr. Gennadius serves so loyally? Mr. Eutaxias said that he had complained against certain measures of the Venizelists as harsh, but that he considered that the worst measures under the Venizelist régime were ideal as compared with the deplorable administration of Greece today.

Mr. Gennadius complains that the Venizelists dismissed many Royalist officials. Does he know that the present régime has already driven out over 10,000 Venizelist officials in only one year? Does Mr. Gennadius ignore the fact that millions of drachmas were pilfered by Royalist officials in charge of the military supplies; that Venizelist citizens have been assassinated; that Venizelist members of Parliament have been in prison for expressing their opinions of the situation in Greece; that a few months ago, in full daylight, an attempt was made to assassinate Admiral Coundouriotis, one of the glories of Modern Greece; that on this very day, when I am writing this article, the Venizelist and foremost Greek journalist, Andreas Kavafakis, was assassinated on the steps of his home; that the very Royalist press itself denounces daily the dissolution of order and of safety, the vast abuses, oppressions, and assassinations?

THE PERSONAL SHOT

I consider unworthy of serious attention the attacks upon the ministers of Mr. Venizelos, who Mr. Gennadius himself praises for their "quite admirable" work from 1910 to 1915, but whom he finds unworthy now, being King Constantine's representative. Mr. Gennadius is well known in Greek diplomatic circles for his unique declarations that hardly any other Greek diplomat except himself was worthy of becoming the collaborator and counsellor of Mr. Venizelos.

In regard to Mr. Gyparis, I may suggest that Mr. Gennadius' quotation of the police records are as worthy of implicit trust as the figures which he has quoted to prove the number of officials dismissed under Mr. Venizelos.

Mr. Gennadius does not seem to be affected by the present plight in Greece. His only interest lies in the ablution of the Royal policies. He has nothing to say about the evil brought upon Greece by the result of the elections of 1920, which have endangered the Greater Greece of Mr. Venizelos and prolonged a costly war, which would have long ago been brought to a close if the change of government had not taken place.

It is to be regretted that a gentleman who has lived in England the most of his life, who has served Greece diplomatically so long, should seek to crown his career with the championship of a régime which is universally admitted to have brought upon Greece undreamed-of calamities. Least of all would one have expected that Mr. Gennadius should have become so soon such a warm friend of the throne?

OUR TREATY NAVY

By CAPT. E. W. SCOTT, Chaplain, U. S. N.

(Since this article was prepared the House of Representatives has voted appropriations sufficient to maintain a treaty navy. The fight in the Senate is yet to be made.—The Editor.)

ARE the people of the United States fully aware of the significance of the struggle that is going on in Congress over the appropriation to be made for the maintenance of the navy during the next fiscal year? The mind of the nation has been so focused on the great program of the recent Conference on the Limitation of Armaments that little attention has been given to the terms of the agreement upon the fulfillment of which the final success of the Conference will depend. There is grave danger that unwise enthusiasm will outrun our judgment in this matter and that our idealism will defeat the supreme ambition of the present generation.

The terms of the treaty recently ratified by the Senate calls for a 5-5-3 naval ratio. This means that the United States should have a navy equal in size to that of Great Britain and larger than Japan in the ratio of 5 to 3 and a ratio of 1.75 for France and Italy. If the United States delegates had proposed and signed an agreement providing that the ratio should be 5-2½-3, the people would have branded them as false to their trust, the Senate would have refused to ratify the treaty, and both people and Senate would have been justified in their conclusion. And yet that is exactly the situation which will most certainly follow if the proposal now before Congress to limit the navy to 67,000 men becomes a law.

THE TREATY TERMS

By the terms of the treaty we are allowed eighteen battleships, there being no limitation on any power in the number of cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and seaplanes. Nothing was said as to the number of men authorized, but it was evidently taken for granted that the ships retained would be sufficiently manned. Otherwise, of what use are the ships? Ships cannot fight without men. In comparison with the announced personnel of the British and Japanese navies, that of the United States should have approximately 120,000 men.

To reduce this to the number proposed would mean that we are to maintain a navy of but half the size agreed upon, and that, through deterioration of machinery, those ships not manned will be practically useless before the expiration of the time covered by the treaty. An even greater sacrifice would be in the personnel, because it takes much longer to train men and officers than to build the ships they are to man.

It may be claimed that a full treaty navy need not be maintained except in the face of an emergency. Obviously, such steps as might be taken to meet an emergency would be, in effect, directed toward some particular nation or nations as the result of action on their part. If history has taught us anything, it is that any such attempt to recoup will be considered by the nation aimed at as sufficient ground for further preparation, a renewed building competition, a jingo press, and certain war. The nation that sets the example in unpreparedness is too often awakened to her peril just in time to begin the preparation that precipitates the war she was doing her utmost to avoid. For this reason, if for no other, it is quite certain that any further voluntary reduction on our part must be permanent, and that we could never recover the place that is now ours by agreement and which we have virtually agreed we will maintain.

Faith in the good will of nations toward each other and in their allegiance to treaties is based on the presumption that the best forces will always preside in the councils of the various governments. While we believe this condition is becoming realized more and more, it is hardly a safe plan by which to order our policy of national defense. The baser elements too frequently control city governments and figure too prominently in national affairs to be discounted entirely in international relationships. Even though no danger be in sight at this time, with the present world unrest and turmoil, who would be so rash as to predict what the future holds?

THE QUESTION OF TAXES

Much has been said about the burden of taxation incident to naval armaments. The great benefit derived from the treaty lies in the fact that, with certain exceptions, all building in battleships and battle cruisers ceased at once and for a period of ten years. This has meant a tremendous saving. On the other hand, the cut in naval personnel proposed in Congress is a very doubtful economy. The difference between a treaty navy and the proposed navy will not mean more than an average of one dollar per person and will not affect most of our people in the least degree. Is the saving worth the risk?

The main point involved at present, however, is not preparation for war, but its prevention. It may be said, once and for all, that there is no difference in purpose between the simon-pure, loyal pacifist and the most ardent advocate of a navy second to none; both earnestly seek to avoid war; and it may further be added that those in the navy are at least as anxious as any to prevent war, for in the event of war they would have most to lose. The only difference is as to the method by which the end both desire may be reached.

Disarmament by example has been tried for centuries without success, because peace-loving tendencies have been interpreted by other nations as weakness and an unwillingness to engage even in defensive warfare, as we have witnessed in our own recent experience. Competition in building of armaments has precipitated the greatest wars in history. International peace conferences and peace treaties have prolonged, but not maintained, peace. Limitation by agreement offers a new and eminently practical solution. It should be given a thorough trial. It is not believed that the proposed reduction of the navy would support this provision of the treaty in a manner worthy of the high purpose and the great accomplishment of the delegates to the Conference.

The agreement on limitation was based on the existing naval strength of all nations signatory to the treaty, and the existing ratio was to be maintained throughout in the reduction of armament. To further reduce the American navy by one-half would have the effect of destroying the balance established by the treaty, even before the treaty has been adopted by the other powers, and so would make it appear that the whole plan of the Conference was a subterfuge.

EFFECT IN JAPAN OF AGITATION

Referring to the agitation in the United States and Great Britain in favor of a reduction even below the agreed naval ratio, it is interesting to read the following quotation from a Japanese newspaper as reported by the Associated Press:

> "We do not know whether this indorses the allegation of a secret understanding between Great Britain and America, but, in any event, Japan must not neglect the maintenance of an efficient navy. The shifting state of affairs in Western countries forbids us to presume that the condition of the moment will last."

Whatever the reason for this suggestion may be, the result is the same—a suspicion of a secret understanding between the United States and Great Britain is at once created in the minds of the Japanese who read this paper. Thus it will be seen that the most laudable and disinterested motives may be given an interpretation entirely contrary to that warranted by the facts, and the most peaceful intentions interpreted as covering deception and double-dealing.

It was further the avowed and expressed intention on the part of all the powers that at the end of the ten years covered by the treaty another conference be held for the purpose of bringing about a similar further reduction. In accordance with the practice followed in the recent Conference, any further reduction proposed will be based on the existing relative naval strength. The reduction proposed in Congress would make it impossible to match a further reduction, say of 50 per cent, proposed by the nations that have maintained their treaty navies. We would have lost the power to make or accept such a proposal because we would have little or nothing to offer.

MR. HUGHES' LETTER

In a letter to Representative Rogers, the chairman of the United States delegation, Secretary Hughes, made the following statements which may be taken to reflect the views of the Administration:

"But of what avail are this labor and success (of the United States delegates) if the navy is not kept up to an agreed standard? Upon what basis is the United States to enter further negotiations on the subject of naval armament? Are we to impair our existing relative strength and accept an inferior position? I should suppose that such a proposition would require only to be stated, and that no one would defend it."

The people of the United States earnestly desire permanent world peace and are commendably striving for it. It must be recognized, however, that conditions conducive to a general peace are not so favorable throughout the world as in the United States. We have abundant territory for further expansion, and unlimited financial and material resources, have no internal dissensions, and are essentially lovers of peace and have neighbors whose ideals accord with our own. Of no other important world power can all these things be said. There is much unrest and confusion, much racial and social jealousy, misunderstanding, and ambition which must be held in check by force while the leaven of good will and brotherhood work their regenerating power. In the meantime too much haste will most certainly jeopardize the splendid work that has already been accomplished and hold back the very thing for which we are striving. Every mistake, every failure, makes the steps that follow more difficult. We must not overreach, but must proceed with caution, holding fast the ground gained, working with a due recognition of the difficulties and limitations of the problems and peoples involved, yet certain that a cause so supremely just must meet with final success.

THE CONFERENCE AT GENOA

FIRST STAGE

At the time this is written, nearly one month after the convening of the Genoa Conference, on April 10, the whole record of the conference substantiates the judgment of those members of the American Cabinet who have had most to do with shaping the policy of the present Administration in foreign affairs.

They held, when the invitation to participate reached the United States, that the representatives of Soviet Russia would occupy the center of the stage. The Russians have done just that, and the problems Russia presented precipitated crisis after crisis. The name of Chitcherin, Soviet Foreign Minister and head of the Soviet delegation, has appeared in the columns of American newspapers at least as often as those of Lloyd-George and Barthou, heads of the British and French delegations, and the word "Russian" has been printed oftener than either the word "British" or the word "French."

On April 9, the day before the conference formally met, the Associated Press dispatch out of Genoa stated the preliminaries "showed all nations, great and small, courting Russia, although they wished to appear not over eager in the courtship." This dispatch went on to say that recognition of Russia would be a dominant question, and that all discussions would begin and end with Soviet Russia. It was pointed out, in support of that statement, that Soviet Russia's 150,000,000 population and huge territory overshadow the smaller States that make up the mass of representation in the conference.

THE PROBLEMS

Continuing, the dispatch gave the following outline of the probable work of the conference:

> The Supreme Council's Cannes resolution of January 6, from which the Genoa Conference grew, announced that steps must be taken toward the economic reconstruction of central and eastern Europe in order to restore international commerce and develop the resources of "all" countries, which clearly includes Russia.
>
> The agenda which later developed from that resolution, while superficially dealing with financial and commercial questions, seems impossible of discussion without consideration of the basic political problems. Article 1 of the agenda makes reference to "examination of the best methods for the execution of the principles contained in the resolution passed at Cannes by the Supreme Council on January 6."
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> The Italian delegation, to whom the direction of the conference has been entrusted, explains that this article is the pivot on which the conference work must turn. Referring especially to relations with Russia and her recognition a consortium was mentioned at Cannes. This plan was stoutly resisted by Russia, which since has been joined in this opposition by Poland, Esthonia, and Latvia, which met with Russia at the recent Riga Conference and signed a protocol pledging themselves to stand for Russian recognition and unite in opposition to a consortium.
>
> This attitude of the Baltic entente against the proposed consortium was based on the belief that the great powers contemplated infringing their sovereignty through financial control and hoped to place them in the position of colonies, much, it was argued, as had been done with China.
>
> Article 2 of the agenda speaks of "the establishment of European peace on a solid basis." This section, according to the Cannes discussion, aims at "finding a means whereby controversies between nations can be solved without recourse to the barbarous use of arms.
>
> This article, naturally, will bring about a discussion of land armament, which was impossible at the Washington Conference, owing to French opposition. As most of the European nations are finding excessive military budgets ruinous, this has great financial importance.
>
> Russia asserts that she is willing to reduce her army if Japan evacuates Siberia and Rumania evacuates Bessarabia and guarantees for the security of its boundaries are given. France contends that she cannot reduce her army, because Germany is not complying with the Versailles Treaty.
>
> Article 3 of the agenda refers to "essential conditions for the re-establishment of confidence without affecting existing treaties."
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> This, according to the Cannes discussion, had to do with the interallied debts, which were not mentioned because it was feared such mention would prevent American participation. The clause "without affecting existing treaties" was insisted upon by France in order to prevent revision of the reparations provisions of the Versailles Treaty.
>
> Article 4 deals with "financial questions";
>
> First, currency; second, central banks; third, public finance in connection with reconstruction; fourth, exchange, and fifth, organization of public and private credit.
>
> Article 5 of the agenda covers "economic and commercial questions. First facilitations and guarantees for export and import commerce; second, legal guarantees for export and import commerce, protection of industrial, literary and